Safety Violations Cited for Deaths in Subway Work

[Trainspotter]

Safety Violations Cited for Deaths in Subway Work

By WILLIAM NEUMAN

NEW YORK TIMES

Published: August 2, 2007

 

In June, subway workers attended a safety class in a tunnel in Brooklyn.

 

The deaths of two subway workers in April resulted primarily from flawed safety procedures and a lax “organizational culture” in which track workers and supervisors flouted basic safety rules and failed to alert operators of oncoming trains to the presence of workers on the tracks, according to reports released yesterday by New York City Transit.

 

The reports delivered a broad indictment of safety practices on the subway tracks, and called for discipline to be considered for three of the supervisors involved, along with a major overhaul of safety procedures.

 

In one of the accidents, a report said, workers carried heavy equipment across live tracks without covering the electrified third rail or setting up warning lights to alert oncoming trains. In the same accident, the report said, a supervisor assured the two workers he would act as a flagman, watching for trains, and then left his post. Moments later, one worker was dragged under a train and died, and another was seriously injured when he was pinned between the train and a wall.

 

The reports, conducted by a board of inquiry made up of transit officials and a union representative, were submitted to New York City Transit, which has 30 days to consider whether to discipline those involved. Howard H. Roberts Jr., the president of New York City Transit, said the agency was doing all it could in cooperation with the Transport Workers Union to reduce the chances of similar accidents occurring.

 

“There are some major barriers, the primary one being cultural, that we have to figure out how to handle,” Mr. Roberts said, adding, “In many cases people do not follow the rules and consider the rules in some cases not to be particularly pertinent to how they see themselves as getting the work done.”

 

The reports offer the first detailed account of the events leading up to the deaths of Daniel Boggs, 41, who was struck by a downtown No. 3 train near Columbus Circle on April 24, and Marvin Franklin, 55, who was hit by a G train on April 29 at the Hoyt-Schermerhorn station in Downtown Brooklyn.

 

The report on Mr. Franklin’s death is by far the most damning of the two, cataloging a long list of safety violations and asserting that “organizational culture was such that critical safety rules were not practiced in day-to-day operations.”

 

Mr. Franklin was part of a group of workers assigned to remove scrap materials from the Queens-bound A and C tracks between the Hoyt-Schermerhorn and Jay Street stations. The A and C tracks had been taken out of service for unrelated repairs. But the G tracks, which also pass through the Hoyt-Schermerhorn station, had trains running on them.

 

The work crew gathered on the A and C tracks between the stations shortly after 3 p.m. and a supervisor, Victor Crawford, told the men to retrieve a dolly from the Hoyt-Schermerhorn station.

 

Mr. Franklin and Mr. Hill apparently volunteered and set off to find the dolly, a large cart with metal wheels, on a platform adjacent to the Manhattan-bound A and C track. The dolly was made up of two parts, which weighed nearly 90 pounds each, and Mr. Franklin and Mr. Hill began to carry one of the parts to the Queens-bound track where they would be working. Their path took them across the G tracks, which were still in operation, according to the report.

 

At that point, another worker, Mike Williams, and another supervisor, Lloyd London, arrived. Mr. Williams told investigators that he crossed the G tracks, and then went to get the other half of the dolly.

 

The report said that Mr. London told Mr. Franklin and Mr. Hill that he would watch for oncoming trains on the G tracks.

 

Mr. Williams testified to the transit agency’s Board of Inquiry that Mr. London then positioned himself between the north and south G tracks and shined his flashlight along the tracks so that it would be visible to trains approaching the station from the south, a practice known as flagging. But Mr. Williams said that while Mr. Franklin and Mr. Hill were still on the tracks, Mr. London left his post to help him carry the other half of the dolly.

 

Mr. Williams said that moments later, he heard a train approach and then heard the sound of the train operator applying the emergency brake and shouts as the train hit Mr. Franklin and Mr. Hill.

 

The report said that Mr. London, who testified under oath, as did other witnesses, denied acting as a flagman for Mr. Franklin and Mr. Hill. He said that instead he “called out to them that they were on the wrong track.” But the report said that Mr. London’s testimony was contradicted by the testimony of Mr. Williams and Mr. Hill and another worker at the scene.

 

The report said that Mr. London “has the greatest culpability in this incident” and that if he had stayed in position as flagman he might have been able to warn the train operator and Mr. Franklin and Mr. Hill, possibly saving a life. Mr. London could not be reached last night. But the report also blamed Mr. Franklin and Mr. Hill, saying they broke safety rules, failing to cover the electrified third rail with protective mats when they carried the dolly across the tracks, among other things.

 

It said, however, that both supervisors should have instructed the men on the safest way to do their job, which would have been to carry the dolly across the station mezzanine, without crossing the live tracks.

 

In the case of Mr. Boggs, the report on his death said that he may have thought that the downtown express track at Columbus Circle where he was struck, at about 11:20 p.m., had already been closed to train traffic.

 

The express track had been scheduled to come out of service at 11 p.m., but at about the same time a train had stalled on the local track at the 66th Street station. That prompted train controllers to decide to keep the express track in operation temporarily.

 

The report said that there was no communication between Mr. Boggs’s supervisor and train controllers that would have allowed him to learn of the change and pass word along to the workers. It also said that the supervisor was unaware of a requirement that he inform train controllers before sending workers onto the tracks.

 

In the aftermath of the two deaths, Mr. Roberts instituted several changes to work procedures and ordered all track workers to undergo a refresher course in safety. Mr. Roberts said yesterday that he would consider further changes and other recommendations being developed by a safety task force he formed in cooperation with Roger Toussaint, the president of the transit workers union.

[Eastman346]

Now the supervisors get the blame. The MTA is also to blame for letting supervisors get away with that.

[sebbieprops]

Both the supervisors and the MTA ought to be held liable.

[Harry]

Now the supervisors get the blame. The MTA is also to blame for letting supervisors get away with that.

 

Both the supervisors and the MTA ought to be held liable.

 

I agree with the both of you guys. The blame lays squarely on the MTA, period!

[Eastman346]

How are you going to blame lower management when middle and upper management should have been keeping track of the track workers and their supervisors.