Trains collide/derail at 96th St IRT Station

[QM1to6Ave]

I don't understand how one of the two trains wasn't stopped by a red signal 

[Vulturious]

27 minutes ago, QM1to6Ave said:

I don't understand how one of the two trains wasn't stopped by a red signal 

Something about the brakes not working cause it was already activated, hence why it was out of service in the first place.

[Kamen Rider]

1 hour ago, QM1to6Ave said:

I don't understand how one of the two trains wasn't stopped by a red signal 

when we cut out the brakes on a train, the trip cock does nothing. 

[553 Bridgeton]

7 hours ago, Kamen Rider said:

when we cut out the brakes on a train, the trip cock does nothing. 

So there you have it, no back up safety features in place. Apparently they was controlling from the 3rd car. My guess mgt wanted this train back in the yard asap putting pressure on the crew. My friend is a op on the 2 line and I know the kind of pressure that exists to get things done. She had a lite train from 241-flat, upon entering 96 they pushed her on the local but then yelling at her(over the radio)for stopping in stations, but with a train right in front wtf can you do. 
 

The culture within MTA mgt needs to be cleaned up. 
 

One thing for sure my money has them putting front facing outward cameras on all train soon rather then later. 

[Kamen Rider]

13 minutes ago, 553 Bridgeton said:

So there you have it, no back up safety features in place. Apparently they was controlling from the 3rd car. My guess mgt wanted this train back in the yard asap putting pressure on the crew. My friend is a op on the 2 line and I know the kind of pressure that exists to get things done. She had a lite train from 241-flat, upon entering 96 they pushed her on the local but then yelling at her(over the radio)for stopping in stations, but with a train right in front wtf can you do. 
 

The culture within MTA mgt needs to be cleaned up. 
 

One thing for sure my money has them putting front facing outward cameras on all train soon rather then later. 

Firstly, it was the 6th car, the cars in between have had their controls cannibalized, along with the fact the third car, like the other 5, wouldn't not be mechanically connected to the back half of the train where everything works. 

secondly, if you're running lite, you're not allowed to stop within stations unless it's to punch, drop off/pick up personal (a TSS or an RCI for example), or in the event of an emergency, Lite trains are supposed to stop outside of the station until they are sure they can continue on beyond the station. 

[zacster]

There were at least 4 failures in this. 

1.  Miscommunication.  The OOS train was likely told that it was clear to go to 240th St, and they thought they had a clear track.  The in service train crew and the tower did not know this and was crossed in front of the OOS train, and the OOS train was not made aware of it.

2. Human error.  The OOS train crew did not react to the signals in time to stop the train, especially given they thought they were cleared.  Or alternatively, the yellow automatic signals indicated they could proceed but the red home signal was not visible until too late.

3. Operational.  The OOS train was being operated from the 6th Car.  Not the 2nd or 3rd, the 6th.  That is too far back given the experience at Roosevelt.

4. Signals.  The signals are not set up to stop a train in time when operated this way.  Also see above on human error.

I am just speculating here but I'm willing to bet that at least 3 of these played in.

[Peter Dougherty]

1 hour ago, Kamen Rider said:

secondly, if you're running lite, you're not allowed to stop within stations unless it's to punch, drop off/pick up personal (a TSS or an RCI for example), or in the event of an emergency, Lite trains are supposed to stop outside of the station until they are sure they can continue on beyond the station. 

I've seen this mentioned elsewhere as well, and Rule 2.39(j) seems pretty clear to this non-employee. Unless ordered by the Rail Control Center or an RTO Supervisor, Train Operators operating LIGHT trains must not enter stations, unless they can get their entire train beyond the station platform without making a stop (emphasis mine). In this case they should have had a stop and stay indication at X-288 if the passenger train on 3Tk. had a proceed on the diverging route signal on X-300. Even if the OCC or RTO Supervisor (TSS?) authorized them to enter 96th Street, they should have been at a full stop behind 288.

The accident scene appears to have been about 200 feet or so north of the station (rough estimate). I think the big questions that will need to be answered is who gave the light train the command to enter 96th St (and why), or if nobody did and it had been completely stopped behind the home signal, how did it move on its own, and if so, how. Could whoever was in the front car have even tried to wrap on a handbrake as soon as they saw it pass the signal at danger? Would it have helped in any way? So many questions, and the NTSB will hopefully be able to get to the bottom of it.

Fortunately the tracks within the station are level and there was a slight upgrade (1.4%) leaving it northbound, rather than a downgrade, which could have exacerbated the situation.

 

[QM1to6Ave]

10 hours ago, Kamen Rider said:

when we cut out the brakes on a train, the trip cock does nothing. 

Ahh, thank you! This may sound dumb, but what does "cutting out the brakes" mean exactly? The train can still be stopped.manually, right?

[Kamen Rider]

1 hour ago, QM1to6Ave said:

Ahh, thank you! This may sound dumb, but what does "cutting out the brakes" mean exactly? The train can still be stopped.manually, right?

I mean it’s literally what it says on the tin, cutting out, disconnecting, the brakes for that car/cars
 

there are some hidden spots where there are controls to turn off the brakes on a car, allowing it to be moved if the brakes would otherwise be on.

[Kamen Rider]

1 hour ago, zacster said:

1.  Miscommunication.  The OOS train was likely told that it was clear to go to 240th St, and they thought they had a clear track.  The in service train crew and the tower did not know this and was crossed in front of the OOS train, and the OOS train was not made aware of it.

 

With the Mainline A division’s ATS system, everything is handled from control outside of the terminal dispatcher’s work.

Control handles the switches. Control sets the lineups. 

[Peter Dougherty]

At yesterday's NTSB conference they stated that the light train had the brakes and motors cut out in the front five cars; the R62As here are arranged in two 5-car units to make up a train.  The front half of the train was rolling essentially like a shopping cart; no motor, no brakes, just being pushed and stopped from the 5-car unit behind. It was said that there were two employees at the head end looking out the front, ostensibly relaying signal and track information to the train operator who was in the 6th car of the train and making control inputs from there.

5 minutes ago, Kamen Rider said:

With the Mainline A division’s ATS system, everything is handled from control outside of the terminal dispatcher’s work. Control handles the switches. Control sets the lineups. 

It's highly doubtful that the local track's home signal (X-288) would have been showing anything but a stop indication at this point for at least two reasons: A conflicting/crossing movement was lined in front of it, and the block was occupied. The very design of an interlocking is to prevent this precise thing, by displaying a stop indication, enforced with a trip arm. With the lead car's brakes cut out, getting tripped would have had no effect. As such I strongly doubt the signal system or the tower/OCC operator(s) would have any blame at all. I hope there were platform cameras recording to capture the light train's actions; that will be absolutely key, in my opinion.

To me, it all comes down to why that train was in the station at all, and even if it was authorized to be there by supervision, did it stop at the home signal? If it did, why did it move with the signal still displaying a stop indication? If it didn't stop, why didn't it stop if there were TWO crew members observing the road ahead, both radio equipped, both presumably with the ability to issue a stop command to the train operator 300 feet behind them.

Another question I have is if the A division road channel on the radio was clear at the time or congested, and whether the crew was operating on that road channel, or the train-to-train "talkaround" channel. The transit system's radio system infrastructure is essentially a holdover from the 1960s only with more modern radios. I don't know where the road channel's transmitting antenna is located for that section of track, but it's entirely possible that if the train crew was operating on the talkaround channel and the dispatcher-to-train (road) channel was also transmitting at the same time and with enough power, a stop command might not have been easily heard. With FM radios, whoever has the loudest signal wins and that's what the receiver captures; it would override a weaker signal underneath it. Granted this is a stretch, and wild speculation on my part, but as somewhat of a radio expert, I can tell you I've seen this situation occur many, many times, where a simplex transmission is missed because a repeater or a different and stronger simplex transmitter keys up at the same time; the weaker signal is not received. If the STOP command was given and the channel was congested, it's possible the train operator never received the command. But that still doesn't answer the question of why it didn't stay stopped at the home signal.

[QM1to6Ave]

1 hour ago, Peter Dougherty said:

At yesterday's NTSB conference they stated that the light train had the brakes and motors cut out in the front five cars; the R62As here are arranged in two 5-car units to make up a train.  The front half of the train was rolling essentially like a shopping cart; no motor, no brakes, just being pushed and stopped from the 5-car unit behind. It was said that there were two employees at the head end looking out the front, ostensibly relaying signal and track information to the train operator who was in the 6th car of the train and making control inputs from there.

It's highly doubtful that the local track's home signal (X-288) would have been showing anything but a stop indication at this point for at least two reasons: A conflicting/crossing movement was lined in front of it, and the block was occupied. The very design of an interlocking is to prevent this precise thing, by displaying a stop indication, enforced with a trip arm. With the lead car's brakes cut out, getting tripped would have had no effect. As such I strongly doubt the signal system or the tower/OCC operator(s) would have any blame at all. I hope there were platform cameras recording to capture the light train's actions; that will be absolutely key, in my opinion.

To me, it all comes down to why that train was in the station at all, and even if it was authorized to be there by supervision, did it stop at the home signal? If it did, why did it move with the signal still displaying a stop indication? If it didn't stop, why didn't it stop if there were TWO crew members observing the road ahead, both radio equipped, both presumably with the ability to issue a stop command to the train operator 300 feet behind them.

Another question I have is if the A division road channel on the radio was clear at the time or congested, and whether the crew was operating on that road channel, or the train-to-train "talkaround" channel. The transit system's radio system infrastructure is essentially a holdover from the 1960s only with more modern radios. I don't know where the road channel's transmitting antenna is located for that section of track, but it's entirely possible that if the train crew was operating on the talkaround channel and the dispatcher-to-train (road) channel was also transmitting at the same time and with enough power, a stop command might not have been easily heard. With FM radios, whoever has the loudest signal wins and that's what the receiver captures; it would override a weaker signal underneath it. Granted this is a stretch, and wild speculation on my part, but as somewhat of a radio expert, I can tell you I've seen this situation occur many, many times, where a simplex transmission is missed because a repeater or a different and stronger simplex transmitter keys up at the same time; the weaker signal is not received. If the STOP command was given and the channel was congested, it's possible the train operator never received the command. But that still doesn't answer the question of why it didn't stay stopped at the home signal.

Thank you for that summary!

[ThatSubwayFan980]

On 1/4/2024 at 3:33 PM, nightmare402 said:

it was two 62A 1's from what im seeing

 

 

 

Looks like a bad accident there. How many people were injured?

 

[Vulturious]

https://new.mta.info/press-release/icymi-governor-hochul-announces-full-service-be-restored-1-2-3-lines-overnight-west

Quote

 

ICYMI: Governor Hochul Announces Full Service to be Restored on 1 2 3 Lines Overnight on West Side of Manhattan Following Subway Derailment

New York City Transit

Updated January 6, 2024 11:45 p.m.

Restoration to Come Two Days After Collision Incident in Time for Sunday Morning Trips  

Governor Kathy Hochul tonight announced the Metropolitan Transportation Authority New York City Transit will resume full subway service on the  lines overnight Saturday into early Sunday, January 7, 2023. The full restoration of service will come two days after the collision incident, following the removal of two incident trains from the 96 Street subway tunnel, repairs to the tunnel’s tracks and the third rail, and a safety inspection of the tunnel area. 
 
“MTA crews have worked diligently through two nights and days to secure the 96 Street tunnel’s infrastructure for safe use,” Governor Hochul said. “With full service being restored, hundreds of thousands of riders on the west side of Manhattan, the Bronx and Brooklyn will again be able to ride the  lines to get to work, school, and to see friends and loved ones.” 
 
MTA Chair and CEO Janno Lieber said, “Whether it’s extreme weather causing a disruption or extremely rare accidents like this one, the MTA always bounces back on the double. I want to thank the amazing MTA workers for their efforts, and our customers for their understanding during the last two days.” 
 
At approximately 3:00 p.m. on Thursday, January 4, two trains were traveling northbound leaving 96 Street Station at slow speeds at which time the trains bumped into each other and both derailed. There were no reported serious injuries. 
 
Following the incident, crews made substantial progress overnight and into the weekend to rerail three cars that had left the tracks. The train that had been in service with passengers was removed Friday, and the vandalized non-passenger train that also derailed was removed early Saturday. Crews then made all necessary repairs to the tracks and infrastructure of the tunnel north of 96 Street to enable the restoration of full service on the  lines. Power was restored to all tracks, and test trains were operated without issues, on the West Side section of the  lines, by 10:00 p.m. Saturday night. 
 
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation into the cause of the derailment remains ongoing. 

Customers can stay up to date with the latest service by visiting mta.info or checking the MYmta app.

 

 

[DCTransitFilms]

just saw this online showing clearer damage pics.

 

[RTOMan]

19 hours ago, Peter Dougherty said:

At yesterday's NTSB conference they stated that the light train had the brakes and motors cut out in the front five cars; the R62As here are arranged in two 5-car units to make up a train.  The front half of the train was rolling essentially like a shopping cart; no motor, no brakes, just being pushed and stopped from the 5-car unit behind. It was said that there were two employees at the head end looking out the front, ostensibly relaying signal and track information to the train operator who was in the 6th car of the train and making control inputs from there.

It's highly doubtful that the local track's home signal (X-288) would have been showing anything but a stop indication at this point for at least two reasons: A conflicting/crossing movement was lined in front of it, and the block was occupied. The very design of an interlocking is to prevent this precise thing, by displaying a stop indication, enforced with a trip arm. With the lead car's brakes cut out, getting tripped would have had no effect. As such I strongly doubt the signal system or the tower/OCC operator(s) would have any blame at all. I hope there were platform cameras recording to capture the light train's actions; that will be absolutely key, in my opinion.

To me, it all comes down to why that train was in the station at all, and even if it was authorized to be there by supervision, did it stop at the home signal? If it did, why did it move with the signal still displaying a stop indication? If it didn't stop, why didn't it stop if there were TWO crew members observing the road ahead, both radio equipped, both presumably with the ability to issue a stop command to the train operator 300 feet behind them.

Another question I have is if the A division road channel on the radio was clear at the time or congested, and whether the crew was operating on that road channel, or the train-to-train "talkaround" channel. The transit system's radio system infrastructure is essentially a holdover from the 1960s only with more modern radios. I don't know where the road channel's transmitting antenna is located for that section of track, but it's entirely possible that if the train crew was operating on the talkaround channel and the dispatcher-to-train (road) channel was also transmitting at the same time and with enough power, a stop command might not have been easily heard. With FM radios, whoever has the loudest signal wins and that's what the receiver captures; it would override a weaker signal underneath it. Granted this is a stretch, and wild speculation on my part, but as somewhat of a radio expert, I can tell you I've seen this situation occur many, many times, where a simplex transmission is missed because a repeater or a different and stronger simplex transmitter keys up at the same time; the weaker signal is not received. If the STOP command was given and the channel was congested, it's possible the train operator never received the command. But that still doesn't answer the question of why it didn't stay stopped at the home signal.

I suggest you wait for the NTSB to conclude thier investigation and present how this went down..

Then your questions will be answered.

You will be surprised..

No I'm not going to comment on how it went down active investigation...

[Peter Dougherty]

2 minutes ago, RTOMan said:

I suggest you wait for the NTSB to conclude thier investigation and present how this went down..

Then your questions will be answered.

You will be surprised..

Oh, I'm sure I will. I've said from the beginning that I'm seeing this as an outsider to Transit, but who's had Class 1 Railroading experience as a Conductor and Trainman and a reasonably good understanding of NYCT's track and signal infrastructure. But I'll admit that I have extremely limited knowledge of actual train operation practices.

My comments were based on the NTSB media briefing on Friday afternoon, the Rule Book, and basic signaling operation. Like pretty much everybody else in this forum who has no personal knowledge of the situation or is unaffiliated with NYCT this is pure speculation, and trying to understand the various failure mechanisms that could have led to this accident, and most specifically, the how and the why behind the SPAD.

[RTOMan]

49 minutes ago, Peter Dougherty said:

Oh, I'm sure I will. I've said from the beginning that I'm seeing this as an outsider to Transit, but who's had Class 1 Railroading experience as a Conductor and Trainman and a reasonably good understanding of NYCT's track and signal infrastructure. But I'll admit that I have extremely limited knowledge of actual train operation practices.

My comments were based on the NTSB media briefing on Friday afternoon, the Rule Book, and basic signaling operation. Like pretty much everybody else in this forum who has no personal knowledge of the situation or is unaffiliated with NYCT this is pure speculation, and trying to understand the various failure mechanisms that could have led to this accident, and most specifically, the how and the why behind the SPAD.

Oh yeah something er failed alright… 

Get your popcorn ready…

Rule ten prevents me from saying much though.

[Peter Dougherty]

5 minutes ago, RTOMan said:

Oh yeah something er failed alright… 

Get your popcorn ready…

Rule ten prevents me from saying much though.

Understood, however Rule 11 (a.k.a. Rule G in my former company's parlance) is strongly encouraged while reading a few of these accounts

[Lawrence St]

4 hours ago, RTOMan said:

Oh yeah something er failed alright… 

Get your popcorn ready…

Rule ten prevents me from saying much though.

What is rule 10?

[RTOMan]

2 hours ago, Lawrence St said:

What is rule 10?

Code of conduct which covers all kinds of things..

Even being overly critical of who I work for.. 

[LGA Link N Train]

On 1/7/2024 at 3:51 PM, Lawrence St said:

What is rule 10?

Put it simply, the Code of Conduct pretaining to Employees. Can't be overly critical of the Agency, (and adding onto what @RTOMan said) must have a neat/tapered appearance, be Customer Service when need be, things of that nature.

[Lawrence St]

Somewhat unrelated but apparently there’s an  derailment near West 8th St.

What is going on?

[Bill from Maspeth]

3 hours ago, Lawrence St said:

Somewhat unrelated but apparently there’s an  derailment near West 8th St.

What is going on?

A stroke of bad luck.

Edited January 10 by Bill from Maspeth

[7-express]

ABC7 has posted an interview with the train operator in front of the disabled 1 train who was acting as a flagger.  Seemed to point the finger at a radio communication technical error: https://abc7ny.com/subway-collision-derailment-train-operator-new-york-city/14310375/